Reasonable diligence does not require an employee of the organization to communicate information unless the communication is part of the individual’s regular duties or the individual knows a matter involving the trust would be materially affected by the information. 736.0108(1) for the designation of a principal place of administration of the trust and the requirements under s.736.0107 for the designation of a jurisdiction the law of which determines the meaning and effect of the terms of a trust. 736.0813(1)(a) and (b) to notify qualified beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust of the existence of the trust, of the identity of the trustee, and of their rights to trust accountings. 736.0813(1)(e) to respond to the request of a qualified beneficiary of an irrevocable trust for relevant information about the assets and liabilities of the trust and the particulars relating to trust administration.In light of the foregoing, it is unnecessary to reach defendants' remaining points.Except as otherwise provided in this section, this code applies to express trusts, charitable or noncharitable, and trusts created pursuant to a law, judgment, or decree that requires the trust to be administered in the manner of an express trust. An affiliate may include, but is not limited to, an investment adviser, administrator, broker, transfer agent, placement agent, servicing agent, registrar, custodian, underwriter, sponsor, distributor, or manager.“Ascertainable standard” means a standard relating to an individual’s health, education, support, or maintenance within the meaning of s. 2514(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.“Beneficiary” means a person who has a present or future beneficial interest in a trust, vested or contingent, or who holds a power of appointment over trust property in a capacity other than that of trustee.The court in Die Fliedermaus then went on to discuss the above-quoted savings clause of subdivision (b).
The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.# 9264 Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Karla Moskowitz, J.), entered December 5, 2005, which, insofar as appealed from, denied defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint on statute of limitations grounds, unanimously reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion granted and the complaint dismissed in its entirety.
Moreover, the subdivision states that the limited partner receiving a “wrongful distribution” shall have no liability after three years “under this article or other applicable law ” (emphasis added). The motion court distinguished Die Fliedermaus on the ground that it involved insolvency, an obvious and not unusual observation, given it was a Bankruptcy Court decision.
Neither the motion court nor plaintiff attempts to explain what “other applicable law” is subject to the three-year limitations period, if such period only applies to a wrongful distribution under subdivision (a). Thus, the court contended: “There is no reason to think that the court [in Die Fliedermaus ] would have applied [a broad reading of wrongful distribution] if there had been no insolvency.” However, the court in Die Fliedermaus was not limiting its interpretation of 508(c) to insolvency matters under subdivision (a), but expressly stated “the intent of the Legislature to impose a blanket three-year limitations period on a member's State law liability for the receipt of a distribution, and to override longer State limitations periods, is made clear by the remainder of § 508” (viz., subdivisions [b] and [c] ) (at 108).
Relatedly, the last sentence of subdivision (b) of § 121-607 states: “Subject to subdivision (c) of this section, this subdivision shall not affect any obligation or liability of a limited partner under a partnership agreement or other applicable law for the amount of a distribution.” Thus, while subdivision (b) makes a limited partner liable for a violation of subdivision (a) only to the extent that the limited partner knew that the distribution rendered the partnership insolvent, it expressly states that this does not affect “liability of a limited partner under a partnership agreement or other applicable law for the amount of a distribution,” but such liability is “[s]ubject to subdivision (c).” It is hard to imagine how this sentence can mean anything other than that a limited partner's liability for distributions “under a partnership agreement or other applicable law” is subject to the three-year statute of limitations.
It is additionally noteworthy that subdivision (b) of Partnership Law § 121-607 refers to violations of “subdivision a” no less than four times, when limiting liability to a limited partner for such violation to circumstances when the partner knew that the distribution rendered the partnership insolvent.